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Abstract
Due to the flexibility, affordability and portability of cloud storage, individuals
and companies envisage the cloud storage as one of the preferred storage me-
dia nowadays. This attracts the eyes of cyber criminals, since much valuable
information such as user credentials, and private customer records are stored
in the cloud. There are many ways for criminals to compromise cloud services;
ranging from non-technical attack methods, such as social engineering, to de-
ploying advanced malwares. Therefore, it is vital for cyber forensics examiners
to be equipped and informed about best methods for investigation of different
cloud platforms. In this chapter, using pCloud (an extensively used online cloud
storage service) as a case study, and we elaborate on different kinds of artefacts
retrievable during a forensics examination. We carried out our experiments on
four different virtual machines running four popular operating systems: a 64
bit Windows 8, Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, Android 4.4.2, and iOS 8.1. Moreover,
we examined cloud remnants of two different web browsers: Internet Explorer
and Google Chrome on Windows. We believe that our study would promote
awareness among digital forensic examiners on how to conduct cloud storage
forensics examination.
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1. Introduction
The usage of cloud storage, among individuals and companies, is increasing
day by day. Due to the recent report of the Forbes (2015), “47% of market-
ing departments will have at least 60% of their applications on a cloud platform
by 2017” [1], and “cloud market cap will pass $500 billion by 2020” [2]. Even
though cloud storage offers several advantages compared to traditional and local
storage of data, cloud users are concerned about the integrity of stored data, se-
curity and user privacy issues [3, 4]. There exist several solutions which could be
considered by security experts in order to protect the stored data, and preserve
privacy of the cloud users [5, 6, 7, 8]. Adopting security mechanisms is useful
in protecting data against being modified and accessed by unauthorized users,
and make it difficult for the attackers to abuse the data. However, the artefacts
which potentially remain on the cloud storage servers could threaten privacy
of the cloud users. In such a case, security mechanisms might not suffice to
preserve users’ privacy. As a result, protecting the sensitive data against cloud
storage services, which leak the privacy of the users, is trending as an issue to
the law enforcement agencies and other digital forensic investigators. Moreover,
it should be contemplated that organized cyber criminals are always able to
find new ways of evading the rules [9, 10]. This motivated several researchers
to conduct a number of cloud storage forensic investigations on various cloud
services and applications (apps) [11, 12]. However, with the ever increasing
introduction of such cloud services and technologies, having an up to date un-
derstanding of possible data remnants after using new cloud storage applications
is fundamental for forensic practitioner [13].
In this chapter, we consider pCloud1 as a case study to identify the possible
evidential data that may remain after the use of pCloud on several different
computer systems. pCloud is a free online cloud storage service (founded in 2013
in Switzerland), which has over four million users right today [14]. pCloud users
1https://www.pcloud.com/
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are able to store, sync and share their files, as well as make backup from other
cloud services such as Dropbox. pCloud provides client-side encryption such that
the data, which are leaving the client’s system, are encrypted. Moreover, pCloud
has the Quality Management Systems (ISO 9001:2008) and Information Security
Management Systems (ISO 27001:2013) certificates. Due to the increasing use
of the pCloud, and several good reviews that it received from the cloud expert
reviewers [15, 16, 17], we are focusing on probable privacy issues of pCloud in
this chapter. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first forensics investigative
study of pCloud. In particular, We will answer the following questions in the
rest of the chapter:
• What data (and the location of the data) can be found on Windows,
Ubuntu, Android, and iOS operating systems when using pCloud services?
• What data can be leaked while accessing the pCloud using Google Chrome
and Internet Explorer browsers on Windows operating systems?
• What data of forensic interest can be discovered in live memory on the
aforementioned platforms?
• What data can be captured from network traffic?
Before introducing our research methodology and contribution of the chapter,
we provide a brief literature review on forensic investigation of cloud storage
services.
1.1. Related Work
Computer system users produce a great deal of digital data day by day
in such a way that by 2020, the amount of produced data will exceed 40
zettabytes [18]. Therefore, in order to store such a data on cloud, we need
to have more fast and secure synchronization between servers and PCs; for
which services such as BitTorrent are very common these days. In [19], Fa-
rina et al. conducted a forensic investigation on the BTSync client application,
and recognized the digital artefacts and network findings which could be then
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used by digital forensic examiners as an evidence. Due to the increasing use
of cloud computing and cloud storage services, researchers believe that cloud
computing is more vulnerable to security and privacy issues, such as informa-
tion theft [20, 21, 22, 23], in particular considering online cloud services [24].
Thus, there is a surge of interest by forensic professionals and privacy experts
in cloud forensic analysis in recent years. In this section, we briefly review the
state-of-the-art in digital forensics investigation of cloud privacy.
Compared to the other aspects of computer analysis, only a few research
studies have been conducted on cloud storage privacy investigation. Martini
and Choo [25] were the first to carry out the cloud forensics investigation. They
analyzed the ownCloud as a case study, in order to find client and server side
artefacts that could be useful as evidential data for forensics practitioners in
performing cloud analysis. With the gradual increase of Cloud storage services,
there is a growing tendency among individuals and organizations in using such
a service in order to store and access several different kinds of data. Therefore,
most of the investigations on cloud context are concentrated on analyzing the
privacy leakage probability of the widely used cloud storage services. For exam-
ple, Quick and Choo analyzed the process of gathering data, browsing of data
and synchronization of files focusing on Dropbox [26], Microsoft SkyDrive [27],
and Google Drive [28]. In [27], the authors found the terrestrial artefacts which
are left behind when using SkyDrive on different devices such as mobile phones
and desktop computers. Similarly, Quick and Choo studied the possible data
remnants on a Windows 7 computer and an Apple iPhone 3G when a user
adopts Dropbox [26] or Google Drive [28] in order to store, upload, and access
data in the cloud.
Along the same line of study, Hale [29] analyzed the digital artefacts remnant
on a computer after accessing or manipulating Amazon Cloud Drive. They could
recover several information, such as installation path, and upload/download
operations. In [30], Chung et al. presented new method in order to analyze
the digital artefacts left on all accessible devices, such as Mobile phones (e.g.,
iPhone and Android smartphone) and Desktop systems, running different OS
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(e.g., Windows and Mac) while using Amazon S3, Google Docs, Dropbox, and
Evernote. Contrary to most of the cloud storage services that are based on open
source platforms, Apple users, have their own special cloud storage called iCloud.
Oestreicher [31] investigated particularly iCloud service in order to find leftover
digital droplets when using native Mac OS X during system synchronization
with the cloud. There are also various research studies on several different
cloud storage services that we summarized in Table 1. We refer the interested
reader to [32, 33] for a comprehensive survey in this regard.
Table 1: A brief overview of the existing cloud storage forensics research studies.
Cloud Services Public Cloud Private Cloud
Dropbox [30, 34, 35, 36, 26, 12, 37] [35]
Amazon S3 [30]
Evernote [30]
Google Drive [30, 34, 38, 28, 12, 37]
SkyDrive [34, 27, 12]
Box [35, 37] [35]
SugarSync [35, 39] [35]
Amazon Cloud Drive [29]
OneDrive [36, 37]
ownCloud [36] [25]
Flicker [38]
PicasaWeb [38]
iCloud [31]
UbuntuOne [40]
hubiC [41]
Mega [42]
Hadoop [43]
Amazon EC2 [44]
vCloud [45]
XtreemFS [46]
Eucalyptus [47]
Amazon AWS [48]
Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2 we ex-
plain the research methodology and experimental setup. Section 3 presents the
results of our experimental analysis on pCloud. We answer the question “What
data can be captured from network traffic?” in Section 4. Finally, Section 5
concludes the chapter.
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2. Research Methodology
In order to conduct a reliable digital forensic analysis, we should follow a
forensic investigation guideline [49, 50]. In this research study, we performed
our forensic investigation based on the framework introduced by Martini and
Choo [51] which is composed of four important stages (Figure 1):
Figure 1: Cloud forensics framework of Martini and Choo [51].
- Evidence source identification and preservation. In this phase,
we detect potential sources of evidences. We used VMware Worksta-
tion 10.0.2 build 1744117 to create the Virtual Machines (VMs) for the
experiments. We configured each virtual machine with 1 GB of RAM, and
2 GB hard disk space for Android VM, 15 GB for Ubuntu VM, and 40
GB Windows VM.
- Collection. In this phase, we collected the potential data resources and
files in a forensically sound manner.
- Analysis. In this phase, we analyzed the data obtained from the previous
phase. We considered keywords such as “account”,“password”, and “files”
to search for evidence in the memory. This chapter is mainly focused on
presenting analysis results of pCloud platform, however, we highlighted
the collection and preservation approaches as deemed necessary!
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- Reporting and presentation. This phase presents the collected evi-
dences, in such a way that would be acceptable by the court of law. As
this chapter is only focused on presenting potential evidences; we just
shortly discussed this stage in conclusion.
2.1. Experimental Setup
We conducted our experiments on four different operating systems: a 64 bit
Windows 8, Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, Android 4.4.2, and iOS 8.1. We consid-
ered two different browsers: Internet Explorer 10.0.9200.16384 and Google
Chrome 39.0.2171.71 m. We carried out our experiments using the digital foren-
sic research workshop challenge 2013 dataset (DFRWS2). We downloaded the
dataset on 08th December 2014 and evaluated the hash of the dataset to ensure
the integrity of the data. The dataset contains a main folder called test in-
cluding ten directories namely: au, b, img, js, ml, msx, pdf, txt, vid,
z. We carried out our investigation taking into account all the files included in
all directories.
We utilized Wireshark 1.12.3 to capture network traffic in all of the plat-
forms and experimental tasks running on them. Furthermore, we used Network-
Miner 1.6.1 to further analyze the captured network traffic. We captured physi-
cal memory in Ubuntu using memdump 1.01-6-i386. We used Hex Workshop 6.7
(6.8.0.5419 / 1st Sep. 2014) to analyze the captured physical memory of the vir-
tual machines, after the successful execution of each task. One of the main goals
of examining this type of application is to determine the possible remnants on
different platforms using certain tools, which we explain in the following. Apart
from the sqlitebrowser 3.4.0, we also adopted iphonebackupbrowser-r38 for An-
droid and iOS.
2.1.1. Windows
In order to investigate pCloud remnants on a Windows operating system,
we considered two different research directions: i) Windows web browser-based
2http://www.dfrws.org/2013/challenge/index.shtml
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analysis, and ii) Windows application-based analysis.
As for the web browser-based investigation, we installed two popular browsers:
Microsoft Internet Explorer 10.0.9200.16384, and Google Chrome 39.0.2171.71
m on four VMs, and performed different tasks specifically to the VM. Figure 2
shows the web browser-based tasks on the Windows VM. We updated Microsoft
Internet Explorer, and installed Google Chrome on the base machine. We then
cloned to four other machines for the following tasks: upload, download, open
and delete. Since it is a browser-based experiment, installation of pCloud was
not required, as the experiment will be directly focusing on interacting with the
pCloud in the web browser. We used all the folders and files from the DFRWS
dataset during each task. For example, we first uploaded all the files during the
upload task, and then downloaded back during the download task. Moreover,
we captured network traffic during all the tasks.
Base VM
Delete
(IE, GC)
Open
(IE, GC)
Download
(IE, GC)
Upload
(IE, GC)
Figure 2: Windows browser-based VMs.
The main artefacts which are recoverable from web browsers are from their
cache and history folders. Therefore, after performing the four aforementioned
operations (i.e., upload, download, open and delete) using the dataset, we an-
alyzed the cache using NirSoft IECacheview v 1.53 for Internet Explorer and
NirSoft ChromeCacheView v 1.61 for Google Chrome.
In order to conduct the windows app-based investigation, we adopted Win-
dows 8.1 Pro build 9600 with pCloud drive 2.0. We performed six different tasks
as it can be seen in Figure 3.
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Install and Login
(Base VM)
Upload Dowload Sync Open Delete Uninstallation
Figure 3: Six different tasks performed on Windows application-based, Android application-
based, iOS-based and Ubuntu-based VMs. It should be noted that, since we performed the
same operations for all of the four operating systems, we demonstrated all in one figure.
2.1.2. Android
In order to access the system folders on Android, the OS needs to be rooted.
Without the root access, there is no way of accessing the data which are required
to perform the experiments and capturing the internal memory. Also having
the root access, we will be able to run certain commands and access system
protected files. To interact with the given Android machine, we used a terminal
called Android emulator 1.0.5. We accessed the system protected files using
an application called Root Browser 2.2.3. With the help of this file browser,
we were able to locate different critical artefacts related to the pCloud, such
as databases and log files. We used terminal emulator in order to capture the
processes which were running in the internal memory (RAM Capture) and also
to copy the captured file to the main investigation machine. We carried out six
different experiments on Android based application (Android 4.4.2), which are
depicted in Figure 3.
2.1.3. iOS
In order to conduct experiments on iOS, we adopted an iPad mini running
iOS 8.1. However due to some authentication issues from the owner, we were
unable to jail break. We used iTunes 12.0.1.26, 64 bit, to back up the files after
performing the tasks which are shown in Figure 3. After completion of each
task, we took a back up of the whole ipad using iTunes with the use of iPhone
Backup Browser 1.2.0.6 (by Google project). We were able to track the changes
which was made during the installation procedure of the pCloud.
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2.1.4. Ubuntu
We adopted the Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS (Trusty Tahr) to carry out our inves-
tigation. We installed the pcloud drive 2.0 through the Ubuntu software center.
We also performed the uninstallation process through the Ubuntu software cen-
ter. We installed the pCloud drive on a main VM which was the “install and
login”. We also cloned this virtual machine for the other tasks: upload, down-
load, sync, open, delete and uninstallation (see Figure 3). In fact, we cloned
these machines in order to avoid the virtual memory being overwritten by the
execution of the next task, which would erase the evidence of the previous task
with the new evidence of the next task.
The DFRWS dataset contained various types of files, and we used all of them
in the experiments. For example, during upload, we uploaded all the folders and
files. After the successful execution of each task, we captured the live memory
using memdump 1.01-6. During carrying out all the tasks, we also captured the
network traffic using Wireshark 1.12.3.
3. Analysis and Findings
In this section, we present our experimental findings along with the data
anaylsis. In order to analyze the live memory we accessed the VM folders while
the VM was powered on. We analyzed this memory, using Hex Workshop, after
the corresponding task was successfully performed on the VM. It should be
noted that, if we do not mention a specific action (such as download, upload,
sync, or delete), it means there was no evidence which could be used by a
forensic investigator for further analysis of that action.
3.1. Windows Browser-Based Experiments
We first set up the base virtual machine in order to conduct the experiments
over Windows browser-based. As all the clones had the latest version of the
Internet Explorer and Google Chrome, we avoided installing and updating the
browsers when conducting experiments. We started the experiments with the
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“upload” VM, leading to the “download” VM, and after that “open” and “delete”
VMs.
3.1.1. Upload
We were able to acquire information such as uploaded file names and the
user names, which was used to upload the data to the pCloud, using Internet
Explorer. As Figure 4 shows, we could discover the folder path from the memory.
!
Figure 4: Windows Browser-based – Uploaded Files
3.1.2. Install and Login
As it can be seen in Figure 5, the passwords and the email address are clearly
discoverable from the physical memory, along with the interested file names and
directories. These information are valuable for a forensic examiner.
!
!
Figure 5: Windows Browser-based – Install and Login
We utilized NirSoft IEPassView 1.32 in order to analyse the saved data files
by the Internet Explorer. We found out that Internet Explorer saves the pCloud
credentials in the registry. However, search results do not reveal any kind of
information regarding the credentials in the Internet Explorer cache files, for
which we used IECacheview to perform analysis. Obtained results indicate that
all the uploads went through an encrypted server, making it difficult to gather
much information about the uploads.
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We also analyzed the memory image focusing on the Google Chrome browser.
We were able to retrieve remnants such as username and password which was
used to access pCloud (Figure 6). We could also find evidential data through
ChromeCacheView for Google Chrome cache, along with the links which were
accessed during the tasks.
!
Figure 6: Chrome – pCloud credentials
3.2. Windows app-Based Experiments
In this section we discuss the evidential data we obtained while analysing the
pCloud application (app) installed on Windows OS. We explain three different
tasks: Install and Login, Delete, and Uninstall.
3.2.1. Install and Login
Upon the first installation of the pCloud on Windows, we have traced down
the changes that the app made on both file system and the registry of the
computer. The pCloud client created and modified the following address on the
disk drive: Users\User\Documents\pCloud Sync. This address is used to
store the pCloud client files, the configuration and some other necessary files.
Other than the system’s disk drive, pCloud has created entries in the registry
of the Windows. The Registry entries can be find in the following locations:
• HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\pcloud
• HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\pcloud LTD\pCloud Drive
• HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
Uninstall\{3e0d7412−ce78−4007−a287−f4a4b42460b2}\DisplayName:
"pCloud Drive"
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• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
Uninstall\{3e0d7412−ce78−4007−a287−f4a4b42460b2}\DisplayVersion:
"2.0.3.0"
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
Uninstall\{3e0d7412− ce78− 4007− a287− f4a4b42460b2}\Publisher:
"pCloud LTD"
• HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\
FirewallPoli cy\FirewallRules\{9CB654A6−21A1−46DA−A953−
0FCB19FE13CA}: "v2.22|Action=Allow|Active=TRUE|Dir=In|
Protocol=6|App=% ProgramFiles(x86)% pCloud Drive\pCloud.exe|
Name=pCloud|Edge=TRUE|"
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\
S-1-5-18\Products\2CB735048C972D445A5864132F3A0314\InstallProperties\
DisplayName: "pCloud Drive"
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\
S-1-5-18\Products\2CB735048C972D445A5864132F3A0314\InstallProperties\
Publisher: "pCloud LTD"
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\
{3e0d7412−ce78−4007−a287−f4a4b42460b2} \QuietUninstallString:
"%ProgramData% PackageCache\{3e0d7412−ce78−4007−a287−f4a4b42460b2}
\pCloud Drive.exe /uninstall /quiet"
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\
S-1-5-18\Components\B8991F4234EFEBC4F8A2180B2B003A2C\
2CB735048C972D445A5864132F3A0314: "01:\Software\pCloud\AppPath"
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{0b73fac−351f−3948−9d8a−1dad9d870193}
\InprocServer32\CodeBase:file:///%ProgramFiles(x86)%pCloudDrive/
ContextMenuHandler.DLL
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We found out that pCloud creates some files in the Run and also Uninstall
folders of the registry. Other than changes in the registry and local hard drive,
we noticed changes in the rules for Windows Firewall in order to solve the issues
that may happen while connecting to the pCloud Servers (Figure 7).
!
Figure 7: Windows app-based registry changes in firewall folder
After reviewing the memory dump images from the Windows machine, which
pCloud client was installed on, we found out that we are unable to find any sort
of plain text passwords. However, we have successfully found usernames within
the memory dump.
3.2.2. Delete
In order to analyse the effect of the “Delete” action, we deleted some files.
We recognized that it is still possible to find some traces of the deleted file names
within the memory dump (Figure 8).
!
Figure 8: Windows app-based deleted files
3.2.3. Uninstall
After the uninstallation process of the pCloud from the VM, we detected
two registry entries (Figure 9).
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!Figure 9: Windows app-based uninstall registry change
Other than the changes in registry, there were some files left on the disk after
uninstallation of the application, which were located at: \User\AppData\local\
pCloud. Moreover, we found out that pCloud client stores every information
such as “account information” and the “files summery” in a database called
Data.db on the computer. This database uses sqlite dbms system. From this
database file, we were able to extract different kinds of data such as “uploaded
file names”, and “usernames” which the client used to access the pCloud. More-
over, by analysing the database, we found a table called “file” which keeps all the
stored files names. We could find all the files, which we created on our pCloud
account. Furthermore, we were able to recover our pCloud account information,
such as “userid” and “username” in a table called “settings”.
3.3. Android app-Based Experiments
In this section, we provide our experimental results related to the pCloud
application when using Android OS. We considered three tasks: Install and
Login, Upload and Uninstall.
3.3.1. Install and Login
Once the pCloud was installed on the Android platform, the following two
folders were created:
• /Device/data/data/com.pcloud.pcloud
• /emulated/0/.pcloud/
By using “Root Browser”, it is possible to locate those folders after com-
pletion of the installation process. Moreover, an examination of the memory
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capture revealed useful information other than user login details, such as folder
paths, its database location and other pCloud related information. We recog-
nized that the database for pCloud was stored in the following locations:
• /data/data/com.pcloud.pcloud/databases/PCloudDB/
• /data/data/com.pcloud.pcloud/databases/PCloudDB-journal/
Analysing the database using Sqlitebrowser 3.4.0, it is possible to find “user-
names”, “email quota”, and “tables”, which are related to pCloud communica-
tions. Once the pCloud was installed, We logged in from the account which
we created previously. Then, the system analyser dumped the whole memory
of Android and sent it to analysis machine for further analysis. We analyzed
the memory using Hex Workshop 6.7. In order to find data related to the user
account, we used a search string (i.e., “account=”). This way, we could identify
the account which we had registered for the cloud storage (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Android – account details
Upon finding the registered account, we used it in order to check if it is
possible to find more credentials’ details! Figure 11 shows the extracted artefacts
highlighted in yellow.
3.3.2. Upload
Considering the upload task, we could recover some of the files, which were
uploaded to the pCloud, from the memory capture. To this end, we used the
search string “file”. A part of the files are demonstrated in Figure 12 (the
highlighted parts).
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Figure 11: Android – pCloud suspected credentials (highlighted part)
Figure 12: Android based – uploaded files
3.3.3. Uninstall
In order to investigate the possible evidential data which could be remained
on the memory after uninstallation of the application, we uninstalled the pCloud
application and captured the memory. We could recover some of the folders
which were already created in the installation process. We were also able to
recover some of the details by accessing the default browser in Android. We
logged into the pCloud service using Android default web browser, then we
analyzed the cache file, and browser history. We could recover evidences such
as website information, and some cookie files regarding the access of pCloud.
3.4. iOS Based Experiments
Examining iOS for finding possible pCloud artefacts was difficult due to the
complexity of the OS, compared to other operating systems. Moreover, we were
unable to Jail break iOS. Therefore, we adopted backup investigation method
to detect the exact location of the installed pCloud.
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!Figure 13: Android Based – cookies and web page info
Upon installation of the pCloud on iOS, the folders/files which are depicted
in Figure 14 were created in the following locations:
• Library/Preferences/com.pcloud.pcloud.plist
• Library/googleanalytics-v2.sql
• Library/googleanalytics-v3.sql
• Library/Application Support/p.db
Figure 14: iOS pcloud folder paths
During the analysis process of the iOS backup files, we didn’t find any lo-
gin details related to pCloud. However, we obtained some information such as
“session ID” (type of cookie which the web servers store for a specific user for
a duration of time), and “API key” (a code passed to the computer to identify
the calling program to its user), which then could be useful for Forensic Inves-
tigations (see Figure 15). Furthermore, we could obtain information such as
pCloud installation directory location.
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Figure 15: iOS based – API key, Session ID Findings
3.4.1. Upload and Uninstallation
Even though we did not obtain pCloud login details on iOS, we could de-
tect some useful information such as “uploaded files names” (as highlighted in
Figure 16). Moreover, upon uninstallation we could recover some of the deleted
files. In order to access such information, we used several search strings such as
common file types, for instance “.jpg” and “.pdf”.
Figure 16: iOS based uploaded file names found in the backup files
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3.5. Ubuntu app-Based Experiments
During the experimental study on Ubuntu, we installed the pCloud drive 2.0
on base VM, and logged in. Then, we cloned it for several tasks, which we
carried out in the following sequential manner: upload, download, sync, open,
delete and uninstall. We analyzed all the acquired memory dump files using
hex workshop. We found quite a number of evidences in the memory. These
evidences are clearly useful for digital investigators in order to get to know the
“username”, “password”, and “files names” of the victim or suspects.
As it is demonstrated in Figure 17, it is possible to recover the “username”
and “password” of the user during installation and login process. These in-
formation have high forensic value to the forensic examiners as it shows the
credentials of the victims/suspects. Moreover, as Figure 18 shows, we can re-
trieve the uploaded file names and the file path from the memory dump. We
could also retrieve the same evidences as the ones extracted from the “upload
VM memory dump, during the sync and download tasks. As it is depicted in
Figure 19, after the deletion of the files from the app, it is possible to recover
“username” from the memory dump. This evidence can also help the forensic
examiners to identify the credentials that were used.
!
Figure 17: Ubuntu – revealed credentials during install and login tasks.
!
Figure 18: Ubuntu – extracted information during upload process.
!
Figure 19: Ubuntu – recovered username after deletion task.
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4. Network Traffic
Compared to the evidential data recovered from the storage and memory, we
could obtain relatively limited amount of data by analysing the network traffic.
This is mostly because pCloud uses encrypted connections, such as TLSv1.2
and HTTPS over SSL certificates, which are then provided by external vendors.
During the download and upload tasks, an encrypted connection is established
with protocol HTTPS.
In Table 2, we show some relevant IP addresses to pCloud, which we could
recover during the Internet Explorer experiment. We can conclude that all
the connections to these hosts were over TCP port 443, and used a TLSv1.2
Encryption. Apart from these IP addresses, we were able to track the service
providers for SSL certificates, along with the main login IP address/URL which
we could use as forensic investigators for further analysis. The recovered SSL
Certifcate providers list is as follows:
• http://silver-server-g2.ocsp.swisssign.net/
D3446FD9FE7AFCDEAC1C7AA2210D64FA65B0D782
• http://crl.swisssign.net/D3446FD9FE7AFCDEAC1C7AA2210D64FA65B0D782
• ldap://directory.swisssign.net/
CN=D3446FD9FE7AFCDEAC1C7AA2210D64FA65B0D782%
2CO=SwissSign2CC=CH?certificateRevocationList?base?objectClass=cR
LDistributionPoint
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, by analysing pCloud as a case study we demonstrated the
possibility to recover a numerous amount of residual evidences from this plat-
form. We analyzed the pCloud on several operating systems (i.e., Windows,
Android, iOS, Ubuntu) considering different tasks (such as, install, login, up-
load, download, uninstall). We showed that all the pCloud credentials could
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be extracted along with the files that were used for storage. Even though the
network connections were encrypted, some of the credentials used in almost all
platforms were in plain text format which is an added advantage for forensic in-
vestigators. However we were only able to collect login credentials by capturing
the live memory at the time of installation of the pCloud service. So it is highly
recommended for forensic investigators to capture the memory at the time of
installation.
Our presented research study in this chapter may pave the way for forensics
examiners investigating pCloud and other cloud storage platforms. In future, re-
searchers can use similar investigation method to retrieve other cloud platforms
remnants. Extending presented approach for detecting evidences of different
platforms over cloud, such as investigating mobile devices connected to the
cloud [52, 53], investigation of cloud-based social networking platforms [54, 55],
and cloud malware forensics [56, 57, 58, 59, 60] would be interesting future
works. Moreover, analyzing legal and privacy implications of conducting cloud
forensics [61, 62] and developing relevant solutions could further opportunities
for real-world utilization of cloud investigation techniques.
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Table 2: Recovered IP addresses during the Internet Explorer experiments.
IP Address Host Name Activity
74.120.8.17/25/18/24/23/26 binapi.pcloud.com Install and Login
74.120.8.24/25/17/18/23/26 binapi.pcloud.com
Uninstall
74.120.8.56 C47.pcloud.com
74.120.8.26/25/24/18/23/17 binapi.pcloud.com
Upload
74.120.8.28 C1.pcloud.com
74.120.8.41 C19.pcloud.com
74.120.8.56 C47.pcloud.com
74.120.8.64 C54.pcloud.com
74.120.8.73 C61.pcloud.com
74.120.8.89 C72.pcloud.com
74.120.8.92 C75.pcloud.com
74.120.8.96 C79.pcloud.com
74.120.8.100 C82.pcloud.com
74.120.8.133 C94.pcloud.comb
74.120.8.77 a2.pcloud.com,
translate.pcloud.com Upload
74.120.8.15/7/6/12/13 api.pcloud.com, my.pcloud.com
74.120.8.14 api.pcloud.com, my.pcloud.com,
api8.pcloud.com
74.120.8.77 a2.pcloud.com,
translate.pcloud.com
Open
74.120.8.15/7/6/12/13 api.pcloud.com, my.pcloud.com
74.120.8.14 api.pcloud.com, my.pcloud.com,
api8.pcloud.com
74.120.8.34 c15.pcloud.com
74.120.8.15/7/6/12/13 api.pcloud.com, my.pcloud.com
Delete74.120.8.14 api.pcloud.com, my.pcloud.com,
api8.pcloud.com
74.120.8.34 c15.pcloud.com
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